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Abstract This paper warns against the risk of underestimating the costs—and the
uncertainty about the costs—of achieving stringent stabilization targets. We argue
that a straightforward review of integrated assessment models results produces
biased estimates for the more ambitious climate objectives such as those compatible
with the 2◦C of the European Union and the G8. The magnitude and range of
estimates are significantly reduced because only the most optimistic results are
reported for such targets. We suggest a procedure that addresses this partiality. The
results show highly variable costs for the most ambitious scenarios.
1 Introduction
As the predictions about climate change are becoming direr and support for climate
policy is growing across the political spectrum, the long-term goals for greenhouse
gas emission reduction are getting more ambitious. The targets that are now on the
political agenda were deemed unlikely only 5 years ago. As a result, there is only
a thin (though growing) body of literature that has assessed the costs of meeting
M. Tavoni (B)
Princeton Environmental Institute, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, USA
e-mail: mtavoni@princeton.edu
M. Tavoni
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM), Milan, Italy
R. S. J. Tol
Economic and Social Research Institute, Dublin, Ireland
R. S. J. Tol
Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
R. S. J. Tol
Department of Spatial Economics, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands
770 Climatic Change (2010) 100:769–778
these aspirations. This poses important risks, since the most policy-relevant part
of the literature is characterized by fewer studies. This note analyses the estimates
of climate policy costs and highlights the risks of dealing with incomplete samples.
We argue that when a straightforward review of the model results is undertaken, a
reporting bias is likely to occur, with an inadvertent partiality in policy advice.
The bias in policy advice comes about as follows. Analysts run their model using a
central scenario that is considered to be most relevant to policy. Sensitivity analyses
are done with more stringent and more lenient targets, but results are reported
in less detail. A careful modeler would realize that more stringent targets would
take the model further away from its domain of calibration, and would hesitate
to publish such results so as to maintain academic credibility. Most importantly,
for those models that are more conservative in terms of the ability and costs of
reducing emissions, stringent scenarios are often not attainable or infeasible, and
thus simply do not appear in the literature. Until recently, the standard choice for a
central scenario aimed at stabilizing atmospheric carbon dioxide at a concentration of
550 ppm (Weyant 2004; Weyant et al. 2006; Weyant and Hill 1999). The policy debate
has now moved to a stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations at 450 ppm CO2
equivalent as a central case (MEF 2009; CEC 2005). In order to be able to satisfy this
new policy demand, the models that have analyzed the more ambitious policies have
been pushed towards implementing more optimistic assumptions about the range
and availability of their mitigation portfolio, which has the effect of lowering the
costs of climate policies. In summary, published results for stringent emission targets
are fewer and tend to be disproportionally based on models that have low policy
costs.
This is best illustrated with the Summary for Policy Makers of working group
III of the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (Barker et al. 2007; IPCC 2007, Tables SPM.4,SPM.5 and SPM.6). Emission
reduction costs are reported for three alternative targets. While 118 results were
available for targets in the range of 3.2◦C to 4.0◦C warming, there were only six
estimates of the costs of keeping warming in the range of 2.0◦C to 2.4◦C. According
to the reported results, moving from a 3.6◦C to a 3.0◦C target would double the
abatement costs. Moving from a 3.0◦C to a 2.2◦C target would increase costs by
37.5% only. This less than proportional increase is at odds with the specification
of the underlying models, for which strict convexity in abatement costs means that
stringent targets have higher and accelerating costs. In the same report, the convexity
in abatement cost curves is shown to hold for most the reporting models, summarized
by the statement that “the majority of studies find that GDP losses increase with the
stringency of the target”.1 Indeed, looking at the cost curves2 it appears that the few
model runs that simulated the most stringent climate policies were not representative
of the larger sample. That is, that selection bias occurred because only scenarios with
lower than average emission reduction costs reported results for the most stringent
targets. Such selection bias is potentially misleading for policy makers (Tol 2007).
This paper is meant to shed light on this issue by quantifying the bias that would
occur in a meta-analysis of cost estimates of a range of climate policies carried out by
1Chapter 3, “Issues related to mitigation in the long-term”, p. 204.
2See Fig. 3.25 (IPCC 2007).
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a number of integrated assessment models. We show that the bias can be significant
and propose a simple correcting procedure. This paper proceeds as follows. We first
discuss the data used in this paper, and then present a method to correct for selection
bias. We apply this method and analyze the results before drawing conclusions.
2 Data and selection bias
We avail of a recent data set of model results. The data result from the 22nd
round of model comparison led by the Energy Modeling Forum (EMF22). We
focus on the international scenarios as this is the richest set of data.3 Details of the
scenarios and of the main implications can be found in Clarke et al. (2009). Ten
models4 from across the rich world ran ten scenarios, that had three alternative levels
of atmospheric stabilization in 2100 (450, 550 and 650 CO2-eq ppm), allowed or
disallowed overshooting the target in the intermediate run, and had two alternative
specifications of international participation (global emission reduction from 2012
onwards versus delayed participation by developing countries). The modelers were
explicitly asked to run all scenarios, including the more stringent ones; although
they did not report results in case of infeasibility5 or unrealistically high initial
carbon price (above 1000$/tCO2 in 2012), they did report the fact that the target
was “infeasible” according to their model.
We focus our attention on the economic implications of climate stabilization
scenarios. Nine out of ten6 models reported economic costs expressed either—or
both—as GDP loss and abatement costs, two common metrics for macro-economic
and energy system models. To maximize consistency in the use of the cost metrics,
we have used change in GDP for all the (seven) models that reported it and total
abatement cost in the remaining (two) cases. Policy costs have been calculated
relative to the baseline, actualized in net present values using a 5% discount
rate.
Since some models reported more than one case for each scenario, we have 11
runs for each of the 10 scenarios, for a total of 110 potential observations. However,
only 68 are reported in reality, since some scenarios could not be run by some
models. The first row of Table 1 shows the distribution of model runs that were
completed, by scenario; it indicates that the more ambitious the scenarios, the fewer
the observations, since more and more models found them unattainable. The density
of feasible runs is particularly low for the 450-escenarios, which is troubling because
these are the only ones consistent with the 2◦C threshold.
3Data is publicly available at the following website http://emf.stanford.edu/events/emfbriefing_on_
climate_policy_scenarios_us_domestic_and_international_policy_architectures/.
4ETSAP-TIAM (Loulou et al. 2009), FUND (Tol 2009), GTEM (Gurney et al. 2009), IMAGE (van
Vliet et al. 2009), MERGE (Blanford et al. 2009), MESSAGE (Krey and Riahi 2009), MINICAM
(Calvin et al. 2009a), POLES (Russ and van Ierland 2009), SGM (Calvin et al. 2009b) and WITCH
(Bosetti et al. 2009).
5Either because of “physical infeasibility” (the forcing target was exceeded prior to the initiation of
mitigation) or “model solution” (failure in the solution mechanism).
6With the exception of POLES.
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Fig. 1 Policy costs for the EMF22 data set by model run. Green colors indicate models with BECS
and blue models without BECS. Scenario legend as in Table 1
This is also clear from Fig. 1, which shows the policy costs for all scenario runs.
Abatement costs are convex in the policy objective, but two distinct patterns are
revealed, depending on whether the models feature or not bio-energy with carbon
capture and storage (BECS; Rhodes and Keith 2005). Incidentally, in this dataset,
this distinction almost coincides with the one of bottom-up versus top down models,
which is also known to be a source of difference in the policy costs, with top-down
economic models reporting higher figures. The important feature to notice here is
that stringent scenarios are simulated by the models that display costs that are lower
than the average of the whole sample. Thus, a meta-analysis of such model results
that took the mean of the sample would inevitably be plagued by selection bias. This
could lead to a distortion in the statistical analysis, with important repercussions for
policy advice.
3 Accounting for the bias
Correcting for the bias is not straightforward. Replacement methods such as impu-
tation cannot be used, precisely because there is a systematic relation between the
causes of data being missing and the missing data, that is the values are not missing
at random. In such cases, a model for filling in the missing observations needs to
be devised. Essentially, we conduct a meta-analysis (Barker et al. 2002; Fischer and
Morgenstern 2006; Kuik et al. 2009; Repetto and Austin 1997) and use the estimated
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Table 2 Regression results for the natural logarithm of the net present value of abatement costs as
a percentage of the net present value of the gross domestic product in the no-policy scenario
Variable Coefficient Standard error t-statistic
Radiative forcing −1.65 0.127 −13.0
Delayed participation 0.423 0.124 3.41
Overshoot −0.910 0.270 −3.37
BECS −1.66 0.297 −5.59
ETSAP 0.290 0.242 1.20
FUND 0.721 0.305 2.36
GTEM 0.606 0.301 2.02
IMAGE (dropped)
MERGE (opt) 0.676 0.334 2.03
MERGE (pess) 0.137 0.312 0.44
MESSAGE 1.581 0.274 5.77
MESSAGE (NoBS) (dropped)
MiniCAM 1.204 0.242 4.98
SGM 0.792 0.315 2.52
WITCH −0.363 0.313 −1.16
Adj. R2 0.842 Root MSE 0.459
model to impute the missing observations. We propose a simple OLS regression7
between the (natural logarithm of) the policy costs and a series of independent
variables that include the stringency of the climate target in radiative forcing, model
dummies, a delayed participation dummy, an overshoot dummy, and a dummy for
BECS (which is not statistically distinguishable from the one on bottom-up modeling
structure).
The regression results shown in Table 2 confirm the intuition, highlighted in the
overview paper to the EMF22 exercise (Clarke et al. 2009), that the climate objective,
the possibility to temporarily overshoot the target, and the rate of participation of
developing countries are main driving forces of policy costs. In addition, BECS—or
equivalently the bottom-up structure—have a significant effect on policy costs, since
they allow for more flexible carbon mitigation pathway.
This simple estimation allows us to predict policy costs for those models that were
unable to run the more stringent scenarios, thus addressing the selection bias issue.
Results are presented in Fig. 2, where we compare the original dataset with the one
augmented with predictions generated by our simple model. The figure indicates that
correcting for selection bias leads to a significant upward revision of the estimates of
macro-economic implications of stringent climate policies. Policy costs for the 450
CO2e cases rise several fold, especially for the two more ambitious scenarios, that
were originally dealt with by only two models.
Most importantly, accounting for the bias greatly increases the uncertainty around
the costs. Relying on a subset of models is dangerous in that it can reduce the range
of cost estimates, especially if the models share similar assumptions, which we have
shown to be true for this experiment. Supplementing the data with our predicted
7We also experimented with the Heckman sample selection technique, a model for heteroskedastic-
ity, and kernel density estimators but did not find significant results. There are too few data given
the number of model/scenario combinations, so that we can only estimate a basic model.
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Fig. 2 Policy costs: mean and two standard errors of the mean (95%), for the original EMF22 data
set (reported) and the one where missing values have been predicted (predicted and reported)
values generates a much wider range of estimates. Figure 2 and Table 1 show that
the variability across models tends to diminish in the observed datasets for the most
ambitious scenarios, given that the low number of models that are able to solve them
reported similar values. This feature is corrected when we predict the behavior of the
more conservative models into the more ambitious schemes.
4 What drives the costs difference?
Since we have shown that different subsets of models generate significantly different
answers regarding the economic impact of climate policies, it is interesting to
understand the main drivers of the discrepancy. The distinction between bottom-
up and top-down models has been emphasized in previous model comparisons. The
presence of zero-carbon backstop technology has also been known to be a key driver
of results (Repetto and Austin 1997). The joint role of both effects is clear from
Fig. 1, with models that feature BECS or have a bottom-up specification reporting
lower policy costs.
In order to better grasp the relevance of these underlying forces, we carry out an
experiment in which we predict what would happen if all models, in all scenarios,
were forced to have either a BECS/bottom-up or a NO BECS/top-down structure.
These two polar cases are shown in Fig. 3. As expected, the costs and their ranges are
significantly affected by which specification is assumed. Differences are particularly
noteworthy for the low stabilization targets, though they are visible across all
776 Climatic Change (2010) 100:769–778
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
%
 lo
ss
es
 o
f w
or
ld
 G
DP
, i
n 
NP
V
Predicted: TD/NO BECS
Predicted and Reported
Reported
Predicted: BU/BECS
650e
FP
STAB
650e
DP
STAB
550e
FP
OS
550e
FP
STAB
550e
DP
OS
550e
DP
STAB
450e
FP
OS
450e
FP
STAB
450e
DP
OS
Fig. 3 Policy costs as in Fig. 2, supplemented with two limiting cases
scenarios. Given the strong significance of the overshoot dummy variable, a decrease
in costs is predicted for the rightest scenario. Two main points can be inferred from
this exercise.
Carbon absorption technology BECS, at the level assumed by the models which
feature it in the EMF22 exercise, is an important determinant of the costs and fea-
sibility of achieving ambitious climate policies, since it allows to shift the mitigation
burden over time.8 The scale of deployment of CO2 absorption is dramatic, with 15
(Calvin et al. 2009a, b) to 20 (Krey and Riahi 2009) GtCO2/year of net negative
emissions globally. Besides the feasibility of safely storing such a large volume of
CO2, this strategy would require a large, sustained supply of biomass, with potential
consequences on land use and food supply (Hertel et al. 2009; Wise et al. 2009). On
the other hand, no model features direct air capture of CO2 using chemical absorbers,
a promising but unproven engineered sink (Keith et al. 2006; Keller et al. 2008;
Lackner 2009; Stephens and Keith 2008).
In addition, the costs differences between the two limiting cases persist even
for less ambitious climate scenarios such as 550-e and 650-e, for which BECS is
less or not relevant. This emphasizes that the representation of the economy and
the technology in the models remains a determinant source of difference across
models irrespective of the assumptions about negative emission technologies. For
8Thus, using a discount rate for actualizing GWP losses lower than the standard 5% would decrease
the cost gap between the two cases.
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the ambitious climate policies, taking the reported values from the sample would
correspond to assuming that all models featured the negative emission technologies
and a bottom-up modeling structure.
5 Summary and recommendations
In this article, we have highlighted the risks of selection bias when comparing
integrated assessment modeling results. Using a recent comparison exercise, we have
illustrated that since stringent scenarios can be simulated only by the models that are
more optimistic (in terms of technology substitutability, mitigation portfolio, baseline
etc.), a meta-analysis of model results would inevitably be plagued by selection bias.
We have shown that one method of correcting the bias would lead to decisively
higher estimates for the costs and the range of costs of meeting stringent climate
stabilization scenarios.
This article is meant to provide recommendations for the future analysis of
integrated assessment models. We have shown that different representation of the
economic activity and of decarbonization technologies have an important bearing
on the costs of climate policies. Given the various ways models can differ from one
another, comparison exercises are particularly important to identify robust findings
across model specification, and are indeed at the heart of the reviewing work of
the IPCC. The fourth assessment report suggested that caution was needed when
interpreting the results of the more stringent climate policies, as a slim number of
studied had been carried out at the time. However, approaches more formal than
general warnings are needed when dealing with policy relevant issues such as the
costs of climate protection. This is especially important when communicating uncer-
tainties, which are easily lost in the executive summaries. This note has provided
a first attempt to resolve the issue of selection bias in meta-analysis of integrated
assessment estimates of climate mitigation costs.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
Noncommercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
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